Vanuatu has reaffirmed its global leadership in climate action as the first country to launch a technical assistance programme under the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage.

This historical achievement has been announced by the UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR) and the UN Office for Project Services (UNOPS), according to a statement from the Department of Climate Change (DoCC) and the National Advisory Board (NAB) on Climate Change.

“Vanuatu will benefit from US$330,000 from the new Santiago Network to design a loss and damage country programme as a first step towards getting money directly into the hands of people who are suffering climate harm and communities taking action to address the unavoidable and irreversible impacts on agriculture, fisheries, biodiversity infrastructure, water supply, tourism, and other critical livelihood activities. With such a L&D programme,” the statement said.

• READ MORE: Other climate justice reports

“Vanuatu aims to be first in line to receive a large grant from the new UN Fund for responding to Loss and Damage holding US$700 million which has yet to be used.

“Loss and damage is a consequence of the worsening climate impacts being felt across Vanuatu’s islands, and driven by increases in Greenhouse Gas (GHG) concentrations which are caused primarily by fossil fuels and industry.

“Vanuatu is not responsible for climate change, and has contributed less than 0.0016 percent of global historical greenhouse gas emissions.

“Vanuatu’s climate vulnerability is one of the highest in the world.

“Despite best efforts by domestic communities, civil society, the private sector and government, Vanuatu’s climate vulnerability stems from insufficient global mitigation efforts, its direct exposure to a range of climate and non-climate risks, as well as inadequate levels of action and support for adaptation provided to Vanuatu as an unfulfilled obligation of rich developed countries under the UN Climate Treaty.”

The Santiago Network was recently set up under the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage (WIM) of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) to enable technical assistance to avert, minimise and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change at the local, national and regional level.

The technical assistance is intended for developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change.

The statement said that because Vanuatu’s negotiators were instrumental in the establishment of the Santiago Network, the DoCC had worked quickly to ensure direct benefits begin to flow to communities who are suffering climate loss and damage now.

“Now that an official call for proposals to support Vanuatu has been published on the Santiago Network website www.santiago-network.org, there is an opportunity for Vanuatu’s local Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), private sector, academic institutions, community associations, churches and even individuals to put in a bid to respond to the request,” the statement said.

“The only requirement for local entities to submit a bid is to become a member of the Santiago Network, with membership open to a huge range of Organisations, Bodies, Networks and Experts (OBNEs).

“Specifically defined, organisations are independent legal entities. Bodies are groups that are not necessarily independent legal entities. Networks ate interconnected groups of organisations or individuals that collaborate, share resources, or coordinate activities to achieve common goals.

“These networks can vary in structure, purpose, and scope but do not necessarily have legally established arrangements such as consortiums. Experts – individuals who are recognised specialists in a specific field.”

According to the statement, to become a member, a potential OBNE has to complete a simple form outlining their expertise, experience and commitment to the principles of the Santiago Network.

“The membership submissions are reviewed on a rolling basis, and once approved, OBNEs can make a formal bid to develop Vanuatu’s Loss and Damage programme for the UN Fund for responding to L&D,” the joint DoCC and NAB statement said.

“Vanuatu’s Ministry of Climate Change prefers that Pacific based OBNEs apply to provide this TA because they have deep cultural understanding and strong community ties, enabling them to design and implement context-specific, culturally appropriate solutions. Additionally, local and regional OBNEs have been shown to invest in strengthening national skills and knowledge, leaving behind lasting capacities that contribute to long-term resilience, and build strong local ownership and sustainability.”

The deadline for OBNEs to submit their bids is 5 January 2025.

There will be an open and transparent selection process taken by the UN to determine the best service provider to help Vanuatu and its people most effectively address growing climate losses and damages.

In addition to Vanuatu’s historic engagement with the Santiago Network on Loss and Damage, Vanuatu will also hold a board seat on the new Fund for Responding to L&D, as well as leading climate loss and damage initiatives at the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice, advocating for a new Fossil Fuel Non Proliferation Treaty, developing a national Loss and Damage Policy Framework, undertaking community-led Loss and Damage Policy Labs and establishing a national Climate Change Fund to provide loss and damage finance to vulnerable people across the country.

Republished from the Vanuatu Daily Post with permission.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

Vanuatu’s special envoy to climate change says their case to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is based on the argument that those harming the climate are breaking international law.

The case seeks an advisory opinion from the court on the legal responsibilities of countries in relation to climate change, and dozens of countries are making oral submissions.

Hearings started in The Hague with Vanuatu — the Pacific island nation that initiated the effort to obtain a legal opinion — yesterday.

• READ MORE: ICJ begins hearings in landmark Pacific climate change case started by students
• Other ICJ climate lawsuit reports

Vanuatu’s Special Envoy for Climate Change and Environment  Ralph Regenvanu told RNZ Morning Report they are not just talking about countries breaking climate law.

He outlined their argument as: “This conduct — to do emissions which cause harm to the climate system, which harms other countries — is in fact a breach of international law, is unlawful, and the countries who do that should face legal consequences.”

He said they were wanting a line in the sand, even though any ruling from the court will be non-binding.

“We’re hoping for a new benchmark in international law which basically says if you pollute with cumulative global greenhouse gas emissions, you cause climate change, then you are in breach of international law,” he said.

“I think it will help clarify, for us, the UNFCCC (UN Framework Convention on Climate Change) process negotiations for example.”

Regenvanu said COP29 in Baku was frustrating, with high-emitting states still doing fossil fuel production and the development of new oil and coal fields.

What Vanuatu youth Vepaiamele Trief said… https://t.co/5cFNHhh5rd

— Ralph Regenvanu (@RRegenvanu) December 3, 2024

He said a ruling from the ICJ, though non-binding, will clearly say that “international law says you cannot do this”.

“So at least we’ll have something, sort of a line in the sand.”

Oral submissions to the court are expected to take two weeks.

Another Pacific climate change activist says at the moment there are no consequences for countries failing to meet their climate goals.

Pacific Community (SPC) director of climate change Coral Pasisi said a strong legal opinion from the ICJ might be able to hold polluting countries accountable for failing to reach their targets.

The court will decide on two questions:

• What are the obligations of states under international law to protect the climate and environment from greenhouse gas emissions?
• What are the legal consequences for states that have caused significant harm to the climate and environment?

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

“With at least 15 journalists awaiting trial on charges that could see them jailed for between eight and 20 years, Azerbaijan’s treatment of the press is absolutely incompatible with the human rights values expected of a United Nations host country,” said Gulnoza Said, CPJ’s Europe and Central Asia program coordinator. “CPJ calls on Azerbaijani authorities to release all unjustly jailed journalists and support press freedom, and for the United Nations to ensure that major events are not held in countries with dire human rights and press freedom records like Azerbaijan”.

On November 6, CPJ and 16 other international human rights organizations called on the European Union to raise directly with the government of Azerbaijan the deteriorating human rights situation in the country.

Over the last year, Azerbaijani authorities have charged at least 15 journalists with major criminal offenses in retaliation for their work, 13 of whom are being held in pretrial detention. Most of those behind bars work for Azerbaijan’s last remaining independent media outlets and face currency smuggling charges related to the alleged receipt of Western donor funds.

Azerbaijan’s relations with the West have deteriorated since 2023 when it seized Nagorno-Karabakh, leading to the flight of the region’s 100,000 ethnic Armenians. In February, President Ilham Aliyev won a fifth consecutive term and in September his party won a parliamentary majority in elections that observers criticized as restrictive.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

The statement highlights how, in the months leading up to the COP29 conference, Azerbaijani authorities have pursued a “relentless crackdown” against independent media and civil society, “eradicating most forms of dissent and legitimate human rights work.”

At least 15 Azerbaijani journalists have been arrested since November 2023 and currently await trial on charges that could see them jailed for between eight and 20 years. Thirteen of them remain in pre-trial detention.

Read the full statement here.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Azerbaijani authorities have charged 13 journalists over the past year for alleged violations of funding rules in an extensive crackdown on independent media outlets and civil society, amid declining relations between Azerbaijan and the West. 

CPJ and partners also urged member states of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, the conference’s organizing body, to ensure all journalists can freely participate and cover conference developments without obstruction. 

Read the full statement here.

This content originally appeared on Committee to Protect Journalists and was authored by Committee to Protect Journalists.

Papua New Guinea will face a grim reality of a ban on its shipping of oil and hydrocarbons in international waters if it continues to ignore the implementation of a domestic waste oil policy that is 28 years overdue.

The Conservation and Environment Protection Authority’s Director for Renewable Brendan Trawen made this stark revelation in response to queries posed by Post-Courier Online.

In the backdrop of investment projects proposed in the resource space, the issue of waste oil and its disposal has incurred hefty fines and reputational damage to the nation, and could seriously impact the shipments of one of the country’s lucrative exports in oil and LNG.

• READ MORE: Waste oil – a timebomb for Papua New Guinea – Matthew Vari

“International partners are most protective of their waterways. Therefore, PNG has already been issued with a warning on implementation of a ban of oil and hydrocarbon shipments, including LNG from PNG through Indonesian water,” he said.

In addition, the issuing of a complete ban on all hydrocarbon exports from Singapore through Indonesian waters to PNG.

“In light of growing international concern about the need for stringent control of transboundary movement of hazardous waste oil, and of the need as far as possible to reduce such movement to a minimum, and the concern about the problem of illegal transboundary traffic in hazardous wastes oil, CEPA is compelled to take immediate steps in accordance with Article 10 of the Basel Convention Framework,” Trawen said.

He indicated CEPA had limited capabilities of PNG State through to manage hazardous wastes and other wastes.

Safeguarding PNG’s international standing
The government of PNG had been “rightfully seeking cooperation with Singaporean authorities since 2020” to safeguard PNG’s international standing with the aim to improve and achieve environmentally sound management of hazardous waste oil.

“Through the NEC Decision No. 12/2021, respective authorities from PNG and Singapore deliberated and facilitated the alternative arrangement to reach an agreement with Hachiko Efficiency Services (HES) towards the establishment of a transit and treatment centre in PNG.

“In due process, HES have the required permits to allow transit of the waste oils in Singapore, Malaysia and South Korea for recycling.”

Minister of Environment, Conservation and Climate Change Simon Kilepa acknowledged that major repercussions were expected to take effect with the potential implementation ban of all hydrocarbons and oil shipments through Indonesian waters.

Political, economic and security risks emerged without doubt owing to GoPNG through CEPA’s negligence in the past resolving Basel Convention’s outstanding matters.

“It is in fact that the framework and policy for the Waste Oil Project exists under the International Basel Convention inclusive of the approved methods of handling and shipping waste oils. What PNG has been lacking is the regulation and this program provides that through,” he said.

“CEPA will progress its waste oil programme by engaging Hachiko Efficiency Services to develop and manage the domestic transit facility.

“This will include the export of waste oil operating under the Basel and Waigani agreements dependent upon the final destination.”

CEPA will proceed with the Hazardous Waste Oil Management Programme immediately to comply with the long outstanding implementation of the Basel Convention requirements on the management of Hazardous waste oil.

A media announcement and publicity would be made with issuance of Express of Interest (EOI) to shippers and local waste companies

A presentation would be made to NEC Cabinet and a NEC decision before the sitting of Parliament.

Matthew Vari is a senior journalist and former editor of the PNG Post-Courier. Republished with permission.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

As currently envisioned, this voluntary framework would rely on unreliable, easily manipulated, opaque technologies that have not shown they can be trusted to adequately measure the emissions from oil and gas operations. As countries move toward setting standards for methane emissions on imported oil and gas – as the European Union reached a deal to do on Wednesday – it is all the more important that oil and gas companies’ claims can be rigorously, independently and transparently verified.

The U.S. Department of Energy acknowledges that the frameworks will support gas sellers to “compete on the basis of a lower greenhouse gas profile.” They write:

“There is currently no broad agreement for how companies can credibly account for and verify claims regarding greenhouse emissions associated with their natural gas in the marketplace. This limits buyers’ ability to require producers to reduce emissions and sellers’ ability to compete on the basis of a lower greenhouse gas profile.”

At the same time, the United Arab Emirates-held Presidency of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP28) is working on a “Global Decarbonization Alliance” that would see oil and gas producers commit to eliminate operational methane emissions while refusing to commit to reductions in the vast majority (80-90%) of their emissions, which result when the fossil fuels they produce and sell are burned (called ‘scope 3’ emissions).

The U.S. and other Planet Wreckers persist in operating as though emissions reductions are sufficient to meet climate targets while approving new projects that continue to expand overall production, on track to produce more than double the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 than would be compatible with limiting warming to 1.5°C. IReducing oil and gas operational emissions without sharp reductions in overall fossil fuel production will fail to achieve the cuts in methane emissions necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. As a report from the International Energy Agency and the Climate and Clean Air Coalition released October 11 made clear, policies focused on reducing oil and gas emissions – without reducing production overall – are dangerous distractions and ineffective climate policy.

According to the IEA’s projections, either current policies or existing pledges, which both permit substantial use of fossil fuels for decades to come, will result in warming well above 1.5°C, even with best-case scenario methane emissions reductions. The NZE Scenario, which calls for an approximately 80% reduction in gas production by 2050, is the only IEA pathway that avoids significant overshoot of temperature targets.

As we head into COP28, we encourage all countries – particularly the United States and other major producers – to revise their climate commitments to include metrics to guarantee a decline in fossil fuel production in line with or more ambitious than what the IEA shows is necessary to avoid the worst impacts of climate change.

We cannot afford to throw resources and financing behind infrastructure based on the presumption fossil fuels will remain a significant source of energy.

Lorne Stockman, Research Director at Oil Change International said:
“Oil Change International research shows that over half of the fossil fuels in currently active fields and mines must stay in the ground to limit global temperature rise to internationally agreed upon limits. Oil & gas companies knowingly block, delay, and undermine efforts to address their impact on the planet, and continually use their profits to invest in new fossil fuel extraction over renewables. Reducing methane emissions is important. But what companies need to understand is that what really matters is phasing out fossil fuels. In other words, they need to clean up their mess on their way out the door.”

Gabrielle Levy, Associate Director of Methane Communications at Climate Nexus said:
“It’s important to require companies to clean up operations and reduce methane pollution as much and as quickly as possible in order to protect the health and safety of communities. Still, we can’t lose sight of the larger reality: Cutting emissions simply isn’t enough. We must eliminate most oil and gas production in the next 25 years. Instead, the U.S. and other countries are trying to kick open the door for even more greenwashed, dirty fossil fuels.”

Romain Ioualalen, Global Policy Campaign Manager at Oil Change International said:
“Focusing on methane is a smokescreen the oil and gas industry is using to conceal that they’re actively working against global climate action. The Global Decarbonization Alliance, a new voluntary initiative spearheaded by the United Arab Emirates COP28 presidency, is full of misleading promises that ignore the vast majority of the climate pollution caused by fossil fuel companies. The COP28 presidency must not be under the illusion that vague and voluntary company commitments to address upstream methane emissions, or a framework to measure methane emissions like that proposed by the United States, are substitutes for phasing out all fossil fuels. While cutting methane is an important step, the science says we must stop new exploration and extraction projects immediately. That is what COP28 must deliver.”

Lauren Pagel, Policy Director at Earthworks said:
"The Department of Energy's MMRV approach risks falsely branding gas as green or clean and prolonging its life. That is exactly what the IEA and the UN are warning us about. Any attempt to use reporting, verification or measurement to greenwash fossil fuels has the potential to put us over the edge of a climate catastrophe. We want to see efforts that guarantee a clean up and phase out. That's what science tells us we must do."

This content originally appeared on Common Dreams and was authored by Newswire Editor.

For we wrestle not against flesh and blood, but against principalities, against powers, against the rulers of the darkness of the world, against spiritual wickedness in high places

Ephesians 6:12 KJV

Under orthodoxy mass formed at an unprecedented level of geopolitical unipolarity in the 21st C. it is forbidden/Verboten to question ‘climate change’ as anthropogenic global warming thru CO2 emissions such the narrative prevailing? 

This small article by a little man aka small quarters whom refuses to listen to Orthodoxy such the Reich as does not permit questioning the existence of climate change: rather such the swerve it questions the manner in which such climate change is presented as defined for us; that and the cynical as pragmatic narrowing of the meaning of the term as akin to a form of ‘Newspeak’ implemented/propagated. Denying climate change thu CO2 is rapidly being defined as ‘crimethink’ in the 21st C., akin to questioning the Holocaust, or praying to Jesus in the wrong ‘zone’.  

This, under cultural hegemony which has demonstrable phenomenological as material links to a ‘Cui Bono?’ of absurdity under  a fuckover  philanthropathic (sic)  The real climate change is of a Manichean nature, such the evil of the deprecation of Nature itself; as much as the devaluation of Life as austerity goes Neoliberal such the ponerological peristalsis pumps as dumps? The real climate change is of an evil of the destruction of Nature and the Ecosystem to point of surplus population being eliminated occurring unseen; with such having  adverse implications for biodiversity via collateral damage such the care not?

 ‘When they can get you asking the wrong questions they do not have to worry about the answers ‘as Pynchon puts it.

 Viz:

 Wrong questions asked can be crafted to lead to the wrong answers under a ‘problem, reaction, solution’ dialectic of mind over mind as of absurdity cultivated by spinmeisters – with the intent of atrocity committed in a panopticonic prison as quintessentially a form of Apartheid as of Thanatos epitomized?

 The term ‘Apartheid’ used here in sense of a mass formation propagated as mind over mind: the ‘separation’ is of the evidence of our senses from reason as to a psycho political prioritisation of apperception beneficial to a ruling minority agenda prevailing as hidden under illusion embraced? Esse es percipi indeed as much as what we see is not the problem; it is what we can be brought not to see but that staring us in the face as stomped upon?” (Orwell some metapolitician – blindness as much as deafness can be brought about by a repeated stomp on the face?)

‘ It’ construed as a Nakba at a phenomenological level of ‘er cogito sum‘ translated entropic as ecocidal? That we can be brought to apperceive ‘conspiracy theorists’ as but tin foil hat wearing nutters a form of divide et impera under a nudge of applied psychology as a deluge of mind over mind evidenced such the fiat currency of panopticonic nature controlled as issued to an ideological tithe extrapolated upon usuriously?

Cui Bono: ‘I’ll lend you that idea and you will pay interest upon it’?

 When one ceases to think one ceases to be: the abuse of trust is of the essence of evil. Descartes was a ‘dualist’ by the way, albeit not in a Manichean sense.

This; such that we have a need to listen and comply with ‘authorities’ as manufactured and propagated under  a cultural hegemony which views us increasingly as surplus population worthy of  but eating as consuming toxic shit and premature death as a pauper? 

‘In ze future you vill own nothing and be happy‘; where nothing includes the freedom to independently think or reason as question denied.  It is said that when Torquemada used to torture as disembowel heretics he would claim ‘it is for your own good’; nowadays the torture as technocratically expanded upon such the megalomania mass formed is ‘for the good of the planet’ as demands conformity – and the ‘disembowellment’  become some form of ideological seppuku as ‘never give a sucker at the teat of hegemony an even break’ instanced widespread via externalisation as much as austerity enforced at a geopolitical level?

Say nought of the condemnation to worship filth as philanthropathic at a foundational level demanded?

 While rich bastards of oligarchic collective as Ubermenschen can own gas guzzling private jets and 22 bedroom mansions with heated swimming pools, or fly around the world or sail around it on private yachts, the masses are expected to’ live’ in 15 minute cities and eat cold bugs or lab grown meat, forbidden to use wood burning stoves or gas boilers such the absurdity as the atrocity of the utility of climate change orthodoxy mined under a deep state of hidden agenda?

Such the ‘mind over mind’ commensurated.

 ‘Live and let die’ indeed as much as’ Arbeit Macht Frei’ developed upon – as to where’ work’ reflects as incorporates an unquestioning obedience to orthodoxy in a concentration camp Global for we Untermeschen? Hard work being as necessary sacrifices made by the Demos to save the planet.

 Just a spoonful of hegemonic sugar makes the medicine as toxic shit go down such the ideological fellatio or cunnilingus attained under Hsi Nao ;under a Manichean as Ephesian paradigm where ‘inversion’ as atrocity follows on from absurdity?

 For ‘hegemonic sugar’ read ‘propaganda’.  

Lies can be sweet -especially to those who craft them purposive to a hidden agenda such the bitter truth? Mencken phrases this much better in his perspicacious contextualization of ‘manufactured hobgoblins’?

Such the one dimensionality there no evil, no good as much there no satan, no God?

 The use of Chinese terminology is apposite – in many ways China is now a  bleeding edge prototype of the social credit brainwash which coming  geopolitically as culturally as hegemonically as technocratically to a theater near u  imminently such the irresistible force of AI working claw in claw with other dystopian technologies as Technocratic to point of a hell on earth firmly as corporately raised such the new ‘Voice of God’ echoing in an externalization of built back better under a’ great reset’? 

 Big sentence for a global sentence. 

Nota Bene the bifurcation of meaning?

 Global problems demand global solutions as sentences and lockdowns, indeed.

The arrogance as much as the perversity phinathropathically abounding astounds concerning  the shock and awe and fear  which ‘sick puppies satanic’ can precipitate in the 21st C?

 Strike that.

 Philanthropaths are not so much ‘sick puppies’ as ‘dogs of war’ such the havoc they unleash. Not so much the rattle of scabbards as the shaking of spears in the dark austere existential cupboards/denizens of illusion and fear?

Mine wee views as to the distinctions to be made between geopolitikal power bloks such the negligible nature thereof and concerning illusion are on record; this as much as ‘Eastasia, Eurasia and Oceania’ held in contempt equally, such the alas as small quarters a mere ‘punk’; sense of ‘Bodies‘ by the Sex Pistols as a hard listen to anthem of the Demos concerning not the least ‘transhumanism’ as thereby presciently anticipated? (Not so much as ‘I am not an animal!‘ as ‘ I am not a lab rat!’, indeed)

Metapolitics mangles metaphors; mixes media meaningfully?

Qua:

The essence of  Orthodoxy as a death of thought is inherently not of Eros or love of life; it a manifestation of Thanatos alas; and in such sense the questioning of ‘climate change’ has become under hegemony a raw nerve which only ‘heretics’ may dare to touch upon, such the repressive de-sublimation of Eros? Satan is a sly bastard as much as the road to hell paved with good intentions. The tragedy under such fierce fun one dimensional as a black block looming executional is that people who really love the planet and Life can be brought to accept and support absurdity; that their trust in authorities as propagated as benign can be used to facilitate atrocity and further the cause of death. The belief in ‘global warming/climate change’ as propagated by such philanthropaths (sic) as Al Gore can precipitate a state of fear as much as satan exists as forceful under a state of denial. A denial which goes ‘look over there!’ concerning the guilt of entirely innocent parties imputed? Plant life loves CO2  -it is actually pumped into greenhouses to increase yield. Contrary to the viewpoint of philanthropaths such as Bill Gates, sunlight is good for us.

There is undoubtedly in the 21st C a climate change in effect. The reality that such climate change has little if anything to do with CO2 but a lot to do with such as carbon tax, low emission zones, environmental sustainability such the expertise of Bankers become meteorological authorities under a satanic warp of inversion; bankers whom care for the planet more than they care for the bottom line of usury extracted, such the climate change narrative orthodox  revealed to lead to a bigger economic hit – under neoliberalism as a ‘do what thou wilt’ currency ; this existing to be controlled as issued as much as there a care not for who makes the laws such the resource transfer ongoing.

If one is gullible enough to believe under fear in satanic apostles of Thanatos then one deserves what one to get?: being as of a satanic proposition extended to point of a global Nakba as a frith narrowed?

The real climate change would be unseen.

It is as nanotechnology in the blood; it is as of non ionizing and ionizing radiation, it is of chemical nature as much as consumed unwittingly. It is as much of plastics swallowed by fish as much as nicotinamides consumed by bees as glyphosphate by birds. or plants destroyed such the silent spring satanic  This as much as  DNA as the building block of life disrupted as debased as would be unannounced, as a frith narrowed?

Perchance Moby asks a right question  – though the answer to such may be ‘spike proteins and genetic therapy’?

Any event it has fuck all to do with CO2 and much more to do with a wrestle as in quote from Ephesians above?

This content originally appeared on CounterPunch.org and was authored by Stephen Martin.

Although Israelis celebrate 1948 as the birth of the Jewish nation, for Palestinians this date is referred to as the Nakba, or “catastrophe”.

As the Palestinian scholar Edward Said points out, the Nakba is when “two thirds of the population were driven out, our property taken, hundreds of villages destroyed, an entire society obliterated” (Said, 2000, p. 185).

In 1948, Israeli forces killed an estimated 13,000 Palestinians, 531 Palestinian villages were entirely depopulated and destroyed, and almost three-quarters of a million Palestinians were made refugees (Passia, 2004, p. 1). Palestinians have been living with the consequences of the Nakba for 75 years.

• READ MORE:  The Naksa: How Israel occupied the whole of Palestine in 1967
• Other Nakba Day reports

My father is a Palestinian refugee who was born in Jerusalem. My grandfather began work at 13, transporting passengers in a horse-drawn cart on the relatively short distance of nine km along the old road between Jerusalem and Bethlehem.

He eventually developed a taxi business and then a chauffeur service. He ended up working as a transport manager for the Near East Arab Broadcasting Station which was run by the British Foreign Office.

In early May 1948, the station was moved to Cyprus, the “island of love” in the Mediterranean, where the British have a big army base. My grandfather was offered the opportunity to keep his job and relocate to Cyprus.

Eventually the family joined him there and they lived in Cyprus for about 10 years from 1948-1958. The family moved to Amman, Jordan — that’s where I was born.

On a good day you can stand on the hills overlooking the Jordan Valley, and you can see the Holy Land; on a clear evening you can just make out the lights of Jerusalem.

I grew up knowing that my homeland, this place called Palestine, was just over there — visible yet out of reach. It is a feeling common to many Palestinians. It is a feeling of displacement that Palestinians have been feeling for 75 years.

My family’s experience is like a lot of Palestinian refugee families that were forced to flee their homes because of the hostilities and ended up in nearby countries, waiting for the situation to be resolved so that we could go back to our homes, towns and villages.

We’ve been waiting for 75 years.

The United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) was established by the United Nations in 1949 to carry out direct relief and works programmes for Palestine refugees.

According to UNRWA, some 5.9 million Palestine refugees are eligible for the agency’s services. Most of these refugees live in Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.

They have been living there for 75 years.

The UN General Assembly set forth the legal framework for resolving the Palestinian refugee issue in UN Resolution 194 (III) in December 1948 which demands repatriation for those refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbours, or compensation for those choosing not to return.

This has become commonly referred to as the “right of return” — and it is a right that Palestinians hold particularly dear. In our minds and in our hearts we’ve been holding onto the right of return for 75 years.

Most Palestinian refugee families that were forced to flee their homes in 1947 still hold deeds or keys to their homes. The key has become a symbol of this right to return. The key is passed down from one generation to the next.

They’ve been passing down keys to the family home for 75 years.

When we think about the Nakba we often think about 75 years of statelessness, 75 years dispossession, 75 years of right denied. But the Nakba is also a story of 75 years of persistence.

Seventy five years of resilience. Seventy five years of steadfastness. It is 75 years of a commitment to rights and justice.

Dr Rand Hazou is a Palestinian-Kiwi theatre practitioner and scholar at Massey University. His research explores the intersections between the arts and social justice, and how creativity intersects with human rights, citizenship, justice and well-being. This speech was delivered to mark the 75th anniversary of Nakba Day at Aotea Square, Auckland, on 13 May 2023.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

Unprecedented levels of disinformation will only get worse this election in Aotearoa New Zealand, but systems set up to deal with it during the pandemic have all been shut down, Disinformation Project researcher Dr Sanjana Hattotuwa has warned.

He says the levels of vitriol and conspiratorial discourse this past week or two are worse than anything he has seen during the past two years of the pandemic — including during the Parliament protest — but he is not aware of any public work to counteract it.

“There is no policy, there’s no framework, there’s no real regulatory mechanism, there’s no best practice, and there’s no legal oversight,” Dr Hattotuwa told RNZ News.

• READ MORE: Other reports on disinformation

He says urgent action should be taken, and could include legislation, community-based initiatives, or a stronger focus on the recommendations of the 15 March 2019 mosque attacks inquiry.

Highest levels of disinformation, conspiratorialism seen yet
Dr Hattotuwa said details of the project’s analysis of violence and content from the past week — centred on the visit by British activist Posie Parker — were so confronting he could not share it.

“I don’t want to alarm listeners, but I think that the Disinformation Project — with evidence and in a sober reflection and analysis of what we are looking at — the honest assessment is not something that I can quite share, because the BSA (Broadcasting Standards Authority) guidelines won’t allow it.

“The fear is very much … particularly speaking as a Sri Lankan who has come from and studied for doctoral research offline consequences of online harm, that I’m seeing now in Aotearoa New Zealand what I studied and I thought I had left behind back in Sri Lanka.”

The new levels of vitriol were unlike anything seen since the project’s daily study began in 2021, and included a rise in targeting of politicians specifically by far-right and neo-Nazi groups, he said.

But — as the SIS noted in its latest report this week — the lines were becoming increasingly blurred between those more ideologically motivated groups, and the newer ones using disinformation and targeting authorities and government.

“You know, distinction without a difference,” he said. “The Disinformation Project is not in the business of looking at the far right and neo-Nazis — that’s a specialised domain that we don’t consider ourselves to be experts in — what we do is to look at disinformation.

“Now to find that you have neo-Nazis, the far-right, anti-semitic signatures — content, presentations and engagement — that colours that discourse is profoundly worrying because you would want to have a really clear distinction.

No Telegram ‘guardrail’
“There is no guardrail on Telegram against any of this, it’s one click away. And so there’s a whole range of worries and concerns we have … because we can’t easily delineate anymore between what would have earlier been very easy categorisation.”

Green Party co-leader Marama Davidson said she had been subjected to increasing levels of abuse in recent weeks with a particular far-right flavour.

“The online stuff is particularly worrying but no matter who it’s directed towards we’ve got to remember that can also branch out into actual violence if we don’t keep a handle on it,” she said.

“Strong community connection in real life is what holds off the far-right extremism that we’ve seen around the world … we also want the election to be run where every politician takes responsibility for a humane election dialogue that focuses on the issues, that doesn’t drum up extra hate towards any other politician or any other candidate.”

Limited protection as election nears
Dr Hattotuwa said it was particularly worrying considering the lack of tools in New Zealand to deal with disinformation and conspiratorialism.

“Every institutional mechanism and framework that was established during the pandemic to deal with disinformation has now been dissolved. There is nothing that I know in the public domain of what the government is doing with regards to disinformation,” Dr Hattotuwa said.

“The government is on the backfoot in an election year — I can understand in terms of realpolitik, but there is no investment.”

He believed the problem would only get worse as the election neared.

“The anger, the antagonism is driven by a distrust in government that is going to be instrumentalised to ever greater degrees in the future, around public consultative processing, referenda and electoral moments.

“The worry and the fear is, as has been noted by the Green Party, that the election campaigning is not going to be like anything that the country has ever experienced … that there will be offline consequences because of the online instigation and incitement.

“It’s really going to give pause to, I hope, the way that parties consider their campaign. Because the worry is — in a high trust society in New Zealand — you kind of have the expectation that you can go out and meet the constituency … I know that many others are thinking that this is now not something that you can take for granted.”

Possible countermeasures
Dr Hattotuwa said countermeasures could include legislation, security-sector reform, community-based action, or a stronger focus on implementing the recommendations of the Royal Commission of Inquiry (RCOI) into the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques.

“There are a lot of recommendations in the RCOI that, you know, are being just cosmetically dealt with. And there are a lot of things that are not even on the government’s radar. So there’s a whole spectrum of issues there that I think really call for meaningful conversations and investment where it’s needed.”

National’s campaign chair Chris Bishop said the party did not have any specific campaign preparations under way in relation to disinformation, but would be willing to work with the government on measures to counteract it.

“If the goverment thinks we should be taking them then we’d be happy to sit down and have a conversation about it,” he said.

“Obviously we condemn violent rhetoric and very sadly MPs and candidates in the past few years have been subject to more of that including threats made to their physical wellbeing and we condemn that and we want to try to avoid that as much as possible.”

Labour’s campaign chair Megan Woods did not respond to requests for comment.

Ardern’s rhetoric not translating to policy
Former Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern spoke during her valedictory farewell speech in Parliament on Wednesday about the loss of the ability to “engage in good robust debates and land on our respective positions relatively respectfully”.

“While there were a myriad of reasons, one was because so much of the information swirling around was false. I could physically see how entrenched it was for some people.”

Ardern is set to take up an unpaid role at the Christchurch Call, which was set up after the terror attacks and has a focus on targeting online proliferation of dis- and mis-information and the spread of hateful rhetoric.

Dr Hattotuwa said Ardern had led the world in her own rhetoric around the problem, but real action now needed to be taken.

“Let me be very clear, PM Ardern was a global leader in articulating the harm that disinformation has on democracy — at NATO, at Harvard, and then at the UN last year. There has been no translation into policy around that which she articulated publicly, so I think that needs to occur.

“I mean, when people say that they’re going to go and vent their frustration it might mean with a placard, it might mean with a gun.”

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

Unprecedented levels of disinformation will only get worse this election, but systems set up to deal with it during the pandemic have all been shut down, Disinformation Project researcher Sanjana Hattotuwa has warned.https://t.co/LUVAbALjGD

— RNZ (@radionz) April 8, 2023

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by Pacific Media Watch.

After two weeks of negotiations at the United Nations’ Climate Change Conference (COP27) talks at an Egyptian resort, it is now down to the wire.

Diplomats have created proposals on the controversial loss and damage agenda that will be decided upon by politicians.

Robust discussions at the resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh have seen many collaborations and discord resulting in negotiators not reaching agreement on funding that would see vulnerable countries compensated for climate change-fuelled disasters caused by developed nations.

• READ MORE: ‘Loss and damage’ negotiations dominate COP27’s final day as talks run past deadline
• Other COP27 reports

A key milestone was reached on Friday morning (New Zealand time), when the European Union shifted its position to support the G7 and China which includes Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and the Pacific.

The EU along with the United States pushed back this agenda as it feared being put on the hook for payments of billions of dollars for decades or even centuries to come.

However, developing nations and their allies have been able to stir up support, with major voting in favour for the set up of a loss and damage facility. Australia has chosen to keep the discussion open while the US maintained an isolated position, showing no flexibility.

Now, there are three options on the table for politicians to agree upon and they were due to be debated over the next few hours.

Climate change with Al Jazeera.

The Pacific’s call
The Pacific through the G7 and China has stressed the urgency of establishing a loss and damage framework at this COP.

Samoa Prime Minister Fiamē Naomi Mata’afa today called on the nations to place the same level of global urgency as seen for the covid-19 pandemic to meeting the 1.5 Celsius degree pathway.

Fiame said more action was needed on upscaling ambition on funding for loss and damage and must remain firmly on the table as nations continued to witness increasing occurrences and severity of climate change impacts everywhere.

Option one also entails need for loss and damage to be a separate funding from adaptation and mitigation.

Fiji’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Satyendra Prasad, explained there were gaps in trying to conflate the funding intended for other purposes with compensation as they were not the same thing.

Prasad said vulnerable people in the Pacific “are facing the loss of livelihoods, of land and of fundamental cultural and traditional assets”. These were non-economic losses that could not be compensated through adaptation and mitigation funds.

Financial support for loss and damage must be additional to adaptation funding but also differently structured. Option one calls for existing funding pledges to be made operational in the interim for vulnerable nations.

Short notice funding
Pacific’s Adviser for Loss and Damage Daniel Lund said when responding to damage caused by extreme weather events, finance needed to be available at short notice.

Lund added that current funding available was for project-based support under the Green Climate Fund which took around one year from proposal submission to receiving the first disbursement of funds,

“Something like that doesn’t work when the loss and damage are immediate.”

Republic of Palau’s Minister of State, Gustav Aitaro, in his address to world leaders, said, “every time we have a typhoon, we have to shift funds and budgets allocated for breakfast for students to address the damage. We have to shift funds from our hospital to address the damage, and it becomes such a big burden for us to look for funds to replace that.”

He pleaded with parties to understand the Pacific’s situation as it was a matter of life and death and their very existence depended on it.

“How do I explain to young kids in Palau, the children who live on that atoll, that their homes have been damaged by typhoons and we have to rebuild them over again and again? If they ask me why is it a recurring situation, what do I tell them? Who do we blame?

“Our islands, our oceans are our culture, it’s our identity in this world. I’m sure our developing countries share the same concerns and this is why we are asking them to help.”

Kicking the can down the road
Australia and the US have put forward options two and three for consideration. They propose a soft power influence.

They are proposing more time be given to iron out the finer details to establish a loss and damage finance in COP28 and operationalise the funding by COP29 in 2024.

The Sydney Morning Herald reported Climate Change and Energy Minister Chris Bowen as saying: “The world is unlikely to come to an agreement at COP27 over contentious calls for wealthy nations to pay loss and damage compensation to developing countries.”

He said: “Let’s just see how the internal discussions go. But I mean, I doubt very much it’ll be a full agreement on that at this COP.”

The two countries who have spent time in the wilderness of climate diplomacy, have also proposed developed nations continue to tap into climate funding made available through bilateral and multilateral arrangements.

This proposal also suggests that any funding made available for vulnerable states can be channelled through developed nation governments, proposing it does not need to be faciliated by a governing body like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

The Pacific feels this is problematic. Pacific negotiator Sivendra Michael explained: “This is volatile as it depends on the government of the day.”

Finding a way for more capital
Time reports US climate envoy John Kerry as saying: “We have to find a way for more capital to flow into developing countries.”

Kerry added: “I think it’s important that the developed world recognises that a lot of countries are now being very negatively impacted as a consequence of the continued practice of how the developed world chooses to propel its vehicles, heat its homes, light its businesses, produce food.

“Much of the world is obviously frustrated.”

While the US allowed loss and damage finance to be added to the meeting’s formal agenda for the first time, it took the unusual step of demanding that a footnote be included to exclude the ideas of liability for historic emitters or compensation for countries affected by that pollution.

World leaders will now spend the next few hours deciding on which option to take on loss and damage finance.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ. 

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

On May 23, President Joe Biden officially launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) in Tokyo. Conceived and led by the United States, the IPEF has 13 founding members, including Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. “The future of 21^st century economy is going to largely be written in the Indo-Pacific…We are writing the new rules for 21^st economy”, said Mr Biden at the launch event attended in person by Japanese PM Fumio Kishida and Indian PM Narendra Modi, while representatives from 10 other participating countries attended online.

In a joint statement, the participating countries said that the purpose of the IPEF is to “advance resilience, sustainability, inclusiveness, economic growth, fairness, and competitiveness for our economies. Through this initiative, we aim to contribute to cooperation, stability, prosperity, development, and peace within the region”.

During the East Asia Summit in October 2021, President Biden announced plans to launch a U.S.-led IPEF. Subsequently, U.S. officials conducted exploratory discussions with their traditional allies in the region. In February 2022, an Indo-Pacific strategy was revealed, which mentioned the formal launch of the IPEF in early 2022.

Not surprisingly, the United States has not invited China to join the IPEF despite China belonging to the Indo-Pacific region and holding significant regional economic influence. China has also not shown any interest in joining this framework, interpreting Indo-Pacific initiatives as a U.S.-led containment strategy directed against it. Although Taiwan is eager to join the IPEF, the U.S. would only pursue a bilateral engagement with it. Three ASEAN countries (Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar) are also not part of the IPEF.

The Rise of “Indo-Pacific”

With the shift of the centre of gravity from the Atlantic to Asia, a new concept of the “Indo-Pacific” has entered the geopolitical discourse, replacing the hitherto dominant “Asia-Pacific” construct, even though its geographic boundaries are not well defined.

Based on maritime geography, the “Indo-Pacific” refers to a contiguous zone encompassing the Pacific and Indian Oceans. The geographic boundaries of the Indo-Pacific could stretch from East Africa to the west coast of the U.S. and encompass a large number of countries at varying stages of development, with distinct policy agendas and divergent interests. Bringing together highly heterogeneous countries through high standard commitments on the digital economy, green infrastructure, clean energy, and social and environmental standards under the rubric of IPEF is a herculean effort.

The term “Indo-Pacific” started to be discussed in strategic circles about a decade ago, but it has rapidly gained importance in recent years. The economic rise of India and the massive increase in maritime trade passing through the Indian Ocean have helped make the Indo-Pacific a geopolitical and geoeconomic construct. Currently, the Indo-Pacific is the most contested maritime zone in the world because of the growing strategic rivalry between the U.S. and China and the security interests of other key players in the region.

In the economic realm, the Indo-Pacific is one of the world’s most dynamic regions. The region accounts for more than 60 percent of the global GDP, and almost 50 percent of the global merchandise trade passes through its waters. The region includes the world’s four big economies: the USA, China, Japan, and India. With the engine of global economic growth shifting eastwards, the Indo-Pacific region will gain greater importance in the coming years.

Biden’s Asia Pivot

Since the launch of the “Pivot to Asia” strategy (the rebalancing towards Asia-Pacific) by the Obama administration in 2011, the U.S. has intensified its engagement with the wider Asia-Pacific region to advance its economic and geopolitical interests. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was the centrepiece of Obama’s strategic pivot to Asia. The Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor was also part of the “Pivot to Asia” strategy.

In their foreign policy calculations, successive U.S. administrations have given greater prominence to the Indo-Pacific region, pushing to connect the Indian and Pacific Oceans as a single maritime entity that enables India to play a more proactive role in the region.

However, the Trump administration’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy (FOIP) was a major departure from Obama’s policy of “rebalancing to Asia” and coalition-building in the region. Under the banner of the “America First” vision, the Trump administration took a transactional approach to trade matters that alienated some of its close allies in the region. It also developed a confrontational narrative under FOIP initiatives and narrowed its focus to containing China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific region. As expected, the FOIP strategy received a muted response in the region. Even America’s close partners, such as South Korea and ASEAN, were hesitant to endorse the FOIP strategy fully.

In contrast, the Biden administration wants to revive the “Pivot to Asia” strategy with a renewed focus on building partner coalitions and developing a collective response to curtail the rapidly growing influence of China in the region. The appointment of Kurt Campbell, former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs under the Obama administration, as the “Indo-Pacific Coordinator” is an indication of this.

Setting Standards and Shaping Rules

Last year, the Biden administration conceived the IPEF with two broad objectives: to reclaim the United States’ role as a standard-setting nation and to compete with Chinese economic dominance in the Indo-Pacific region.

For decades, the U.S. was Asia’s dominant rule-writer and standard-setter in the trade policy arena. This is no longer the case as the U.S. leadership role in decision-making processes in Asia has considerably reduced, partly due to its withdrawal or absence from major regional trade deals and partly because Asian growth is increasingly being driven by intra-Asian trade. As a result, the U.S. sits on the sidelines while China and other key regional players develop their preferred rules and standards in different sectors through trade deals, giving their companies an edge in the Asian markets.

The most likely outcome of these developments is the reduced ability of U.S. firms to enter and compete in the markets. The U.S. is equally concerned that the region (under Chinese economic leadership) will become key to shaping the international trade and economic order in the 21^st century without her leadership.

Twenty years after accession to the WTO, China is well placed to use its economic heft in the region to revive the multilateral trade agenda for the post-pandemic era. Such a scenario was inconceivable just a decade ago.

Why Containing China is Easier Said Than Done

Without a return to the “Pax Americana” era, President Biden faced a dilemma about how to deepen economic ties in the region. One obvious choice was to return to a revised TPP or join its successor agreement — the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). However, he chose to bypass this mega-regional trade deal due to a lack of strong bipartisan congressional and public support. Instead, Biden opted for Indo-Pacific Economic Framework to reassert America’s economic leadership in the region by offering deals on new areas such as the digital economy, supply chain bottlenecks, and green infrastructure, where America enjoys a competitive advantage.

For the Biden administration, the IPEF is the new vehicle for economic re-engagement with East Asia and Southeast Asia after former President Donald Trump withdrew from the TPP in 2017. The Biden administration believes that IPEF lays down the economic pillar of its Indo-Pacific strategy and would emerge as a serious challenge to China’s attractiveness as a trade and investment partner.

Through the IPEF, the U.S. is attempting to counter China’s growing economic heft in the region, particularly at a time when China is already the leading trading partner of all IPEF participating countries. China is a member of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) trade agreement, which came into force in early 2022. China has also formally requested to join the TPP’s successor agreement, the CPTPP.

China is further deepening its economic engagements in the region through various initiatives, from building infrastructure under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to joining Digital Economy Partnership Agreement (DEPA) with New Zealand and Singapore. Inward and outward FDI flows between China and ASEAN have grown rapidly over the past decade, supercharging their respective economies by leveraging their strong interconnectivity and comparative advantages in the global value chain.

As a regional and global value chain leader, China has inseparable ties with most countries in the region. Over the years, China has evolved from a low-cost assembly site to a specialized manufacturing centre. It is challenging to replicate the same level of supply chain integration found in China elsewhere. Despite financial incentives offered by other countries in this region, not many MNCs are willing to relocate their manufacturing bases to these countries, as the costs of relocation outweigh the benefits. China’s huge domestic market is another reason for Asian companies to maintain a strong presence in the country.

Therefore, reducing dependency on China in global value chains through diversification of supply networks, or “onshoring” or “friend-shoring”, is easier said than done. Even if some U.S. firms shift production from China to other countries in the region or back home, they will still need raw materials and equipment from China.

The Biden administration must recognize that containing China’s economic clout in the region is not a walkover, as most countries in Asia are keen to expand economic ties with China further. This is despite the fact that these countries feel intimidated by China’s growing military weight and recognize that China will use its economic clout for diplomatic and security purposes.

No country in the region wishes to become a pawn in a geopolitical tussle between two giant superpowers. Nor do they prefer to choose sides if the U.S.-China rivalry escalates. Even the U.S.’s traditional allies in the region (such as Australia, Japan, and South Korea) — who view China’s rise as a threat to their security and territorial integrity and look to the U.S. as a counterbalancing force — wish to maintain closer economic ties with China due to the benefits they derive from trading with China and China’s pivotal role in the regional value chains. Indeed, most countries in the region want to derive benefits from both the cooperation and the competition between the U.S. and China.

Given these considerations, the U.S. needs to develop the IPEF into a credible alternative that offers incentives and tangible benefits for countries in the region to join the initiative. An overtly anti-China strategy is unworkable and may prove counterproductive.

Four Negotiating Pillars of IPEF

Beyond the joint statement and a brief factsheet issued by the White House, little is known about the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. As outlined in these documents, the IPEF consists of the following four negotiating pillars:

1. Trade: The IPEF seeks to build “high-standard, inclusive, free, and fair trade commitments and develop new and creative approaches in trade and technology policy that advance a broad set of objectives that fuels economic activity and investment, promotes sustainable and inclusive economic growth, and benefits workers and consumers”.
2. Supply Chains: The IPEF will seek “first-of-their-kind supply chain commitments that better anticipate and prevent disruptions in supply chains to create a more resilient economy”. It also intends to establish an early warning system and coordinate crisis response actions.
3. Clean Energy, Decarbonization, and Infrastructure: The framework will seek “first-of-their-kind commitments on clean energy, decarbonization, and infrastructure that promote good-paying jobs.” “We plan to accelerate the development and deployment of clean energy technologies to decarbonize our economies and build resilience to climate impacts”, says the joint statement.
4. Tax and Anti-Corruption: The IPEF will seek new commitments to enact and enforce “effective and robust tax, anti-money laundering, and anti-bribery regimes in line with existing multilateral obligations, standards, and agreements to curb tax evasion and corruption in the Indo-Pacific region”.

Not a Traditional FTA

Both the content and process of the IPEF suggest that the proposed framework is not a traditional free trade agreement. Unlike other regional FTAs such as RCEP or CPTPP, the IPEF does not offer increased market access (especially to the U.S. market) through tariff liberalization and non-tariff concessions.

The Biden administration defines the IPEF as “a 21^st century economic arrangement designed to tackle 21^st century economic challenges, ranging from setting the rules of the road for the digital economy, to ensuring secure and resilient supply chains, to helping make the kinds of major investments necessary in clean energy infrastructure and the clean energy transition, to raising standards for transparency, fair taxation, and anti-corruption”. Committing to such lofty goals is easy but translating them into concrete proposals and tangible gains is a complicated matter.

Without offering market access concessions to signatory countries, how will the U.S. attract a sufficient critical mass of countries to sign up to IPEF and make significant commitments? Without broader buy-in from the Indo-Pacific region, the IPEF would lack credibility and could discourage others from joining over time. To obtain commitments from countries that are signatories to existing regional free trade agreements such as the CPTPP and RCEP, the U.S. needs to offer incentives to make joining IPEF more attractive. Why else would countries in the region be willing to risk their economic ties with China in exchange for nothing tangible?

The Biden administration must recognize that in the absence of meaningful market access to the U.S., not many countries (other than traditional allies) from the region would prefer to engage with the proposed framework.

More importantly, the IPEF intends to incorporate “first-of-their-kind commitments” in new areas such as the digital economy, clean energy and decarbonization. It also seeks commitments to labour and environmental standards, which are highly unpopular in the region.

Not many countries in the region would be willing to make strong commitments in these areas, as their policies and stated positions are vastly different from those of the U.S. For instance, countries from India to Vietnam follow their distinct policy frameworks on cross-border data flows, data localization, and data privacy. They may not be willing to abandon their existing frameworks and adopt U.S. standards on digital trade. Countries like India and Indonesia may not accept highly ambitious decarbonization targets that might run counter to their Paris Agreement goals. Similarly, India has consistently opposed the inclusion of labour and environmental standards in trade agreements.

It remains to be seen how the Biden administration would persuade partner countries at different stages of development to sign up to high-standard provisions on digital trade, labour and environmental standards proposed under the IPEF.

Another critical question is what kind of dispute settlement mechanism would be incorporated in the IPEF to avoid unilateral actions by signatory countries.

Going forward, the U.S. and the founding partners need to develop the process and criteria by which other countries from the region will be invited to join the negotiations on IPEF.

A Questionable Process

Unlike traditional FTAs, the IPEF does not subscribe to the single undertaking principle, where all items on the agenda are negotiated simultaneously, with countries expected to sign the final agreement in its entirety or withdraw.

Rather, the IPEF employs a menu-based approach in which countries would launch separate negotiations under four pillars. A country would be required to sign up for all components within a pillar, but participation in all pillars is optional. This indicates that negotiations on various pillars will be handled at variable speeds with different groups of countries. The outcome would be a matrix, with some countries making commitments in all areas and others making in only a few. Commitments might also vary, from sharing information to binding obligations.

The U.S. Trade Representative will lead the negotiations on the trade pillar, while the Commerce Department will oversee negotiations on the remaining three pillars of the proposed agreement. The Biden administration has announced that it will proactively consult labor unions, environmental organizations, and other civil society groups during the IPEF negotiations. This stance departs from previous U.S. trade negotiations and therefore needs to be welcomed.

But what is worrisome is that initial official statements suggest that the Biden administration may not be seeking congressional approval for the IPEF, which is a must for all trade agreements that involve market access commitments and changes in U.S. laws and regulations. Instead, it considers the proposed agreement as an administrative arrangement, and its outcomes may not be submitted to the U.S. Congress for approval. No wonder, the U.S.’s scope of commitments under the proposed IPEF would be minimal.

As rightly pointed out by Matthew P. Goodman and William Reinsch: “That in turn tells partners from the beginning that they have little to gain from the United States by negotiating any agreements under the IPEF. In other words, the Biden administration is suggesting a process in which other nations are expected to commit to do only what the United States is already doing or is seeking. That is a myopic approach that does not take into account the likelihood that other nations will have expectations for the United States, just as Washington has for them.” The IPEF is doomed to irrelevance if it becomes an instrument to serve U.S. economic interests at the expense of regional economies.

While it is understood that FTAs do not enjoy widespread political support in the United States, the outcome document must be submitted to Congress for formal legislative approval to ensure that the negotiated rules are binding and that all stakeholders’ concerns are taken into account.

Without ratification by Congress, the IPEF’s fortunes will remain in limbo. Given the divisive nature of American politics, it is unclear whether the IPEF will survive past the Biden administration. What would be the fate of the IPEF if a Republican — possibly Donald Trump — wins the U.S. presidential elections in 2024?

IPEF’s launch in Tokyo was symbolic in nature; bringing the IPEF to fruition encounters significant domestic and international challenges.

This content originally appeared on CounterPunch.org and was authored by Kavaljit Singh.

Aotearoa New Zealand’s Pacific Minister Aupito William Sio is set to travel to Fiji tomorrow, while Foreign Minister Nanaia Mahuta is under increased pressure over Pacific relationships.

Sio, who is also associate foreign affairs minister, will travel to Fiji from tomorrow to meet with Pacific ministers, and return on Saturday.

He said he would be discussing shared concerns with other large ocean states, aiming to build and strengthen relationships after the Our Ocean Conference in Palau in March.

• READ MORE: Other China in the Pacific reports

“The Pacific is central to the lives, cultures and well-being of Aotearoa New Zealand and our Pacific whanau, aiga, kainga, kopu tangata, and fanau. At the Our Ocean Conference, I encouraged progress on issues such as the conservation of our marine environments and the sustainable use of ocean resources, and I intend to continue these dialogues during my visit,” he said in a statement.

He will also meet with Fiji’s minister of health.

Minister of Foreign Affairs Nanaia Mahuta has been under increasing pressure over New Zealand’s approach to the Pacific as China’s own Foreign Minister Wang Yi toured eight Pacific countries.

Wang secured co-operation agreements with Samoa and Kiribati after officially signing a security agreement with the Solomon Islands.

Greater US attention
The United States has also been turning increased attention to the region, setting up the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework with 12 other countries including New Zealand.

China was unable to get its broader regional agreement signed by Pacific countries, however, and Mahuta said that reflected the Pacific’s view that regional measures should be discussed at a regional level — and she believed that would be discussed at the upcoming Pacific Islands Forum in July.

Mahuta has faced questions over why her Chinese counterpart was was able to do a full tour of the Pacific before she could, and this morning told reporters New Zealand’s relationship with the Pacific was very good, and in good shape.

“In fact the Pacific rely on us to be consistent, respectful, reliable in the way that we work with them and partner their aspirations … I’ll be absolutely looking to meet with my Pacific foreign minister counterparts, which I already have for many of them.

“When the border opened for Fiji, which was one of the earliest border openings, I went there to demonstrate that we want to engage very quickly and as border settings allow I’m going to absolutely try and get to many of the places across the Pacific.”

China had the resources to do a full Pacific tour, had been working for a long time to build its relationship with the Pacific, and Chinese interests in the Pacific were not new, she said.

“They have the resources to do that obviously but they have over a period of time secured a strong relationship across the whole of the Pacific and they’re building on that.

“What is unusual is that they’ve done eight pacific countries… in a very short time.”

She planned to travel to Solomon Islands as soon as the country’s foreign minister, Jeremiah Manele, was available to meet with her.

Sio meanwhile will also participate in events to celebrate Samoa Language Week and the 60th Anniversary of Samoa’s independence upon his return to Aotearoa New Zealand.

This article is republished under a community partnership agreement with RNZ.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

Yet more proposed Chinese “security agreements” in the Pacific Islands have been leaked.

The drafts have been described by critics as revealing “the ambitious scope of Beijing’s strategic intent in the Pacific” and its “coherent desire […] to seek to shape the regional order”. There are concerns they will “dramatically expand [China’s] security influence in the Pacific”.

But does this overstate their importance?

• READ MORE: China documents threaten Pacific sovereignty, warns FSM president
• Other reports on China in the Pacific

A pause for breath
Australia and New Zealand should be concerned about China’s increasingly visible presence in the Pacific Islands. A coercive Chinese presence could substantially constrain Australia’s freedom of movement, with both economic and defence implications.

And Pacific states and people have reason to be concerned. The restrictions on journalists during Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s visit to Solomon Islands demonstrate the potential consequences for transparency of dealing closely with China.

And there are questions about the implications of the Solomon Islands-China security agreement for democracy and accountability.

But before we work ourselves into a frenzy, it is worth pausing for breath.

The leaked drafts are just that: drafts.

They have not yet been signed by any Pacific state.

At least one Pacific leader, Federated States of Micronesia President David Panuelo, has publicly rejected them. Panuelo’s concerns are likely shared by several other Pacific leaders, suggesting they’re also unlikely to sign.

Fiji is joining U.S. President Joe Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, the White House said, making it the first Pacific Island country in the plan that is part of a U.S. effort to push back on China’s growing regional influence https://t.co/XByydU09IP pic.twitter.com/7xphYtRdv0

— Reuters (@Reuters) May 27, 2022

China wields powerful tools of statecraft — particularly economic — but Pacific states are sovereign. They will ultimately decide the extent of China’s role in the region.

And these drafts do not mention Chinese military bases — nor did the China-Solomon Islands agreement.

Rumours in 2018 China was in talks to build a military base in Vanuatu never eventuated.

What if some Pacific states sign these documents?
First, these documents contain proposals rather than binding obligations.

If they are signed, it’s not clear they will differ in impact from the many others agreed over the last decade. For example, China announced a “strategic partnership” with eight Pacific states in 2014, which had no substantive consequences for Australia.

So common — and often so ineffectual — are “strategic partnerships” and “memoranda of understanding” that there is a satirical podcast series devoted to them.

Second, the drafts contain proposals that may benefit Pacific states.

For example, a China-Pacific Islands free trade area could open valuable opportunities, especially as China is a significant export destination.

Third, the drafts cover several activities in which China is already engaged. For example, China signed a security agreement with Fiji in 2011, and the two states have had a police cooperation relationship since.

It’s worth remembering Australia and New Zealand provide the bulk of policing assistance. The executive director of the Pacific Island Chiefs of Police is even a Kiwi.

The drafts do contain concerning provisions. Cooperation on data networks and “smart” customs systems may raise cybersecurity issues. This is why Australia funded the Coral Sea Cable connecting Solomon Islands and Papua New Guinea to Australia.

Provisions relating to satellite maritime surveillance may cause friction with existing activities supported by Australia and its partners.

Greater Chinese maritime domain awareness of the region – meaning understanding of anything associated with its oceans and waterways – would also raise strategic challenges for Australia, New Zealand, and the US.

But there is a risk of over-egging the implications based on our own anxieties.

The omission of #PNG from the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework set up by the US to contest China in the region is a huge mistake & a missed opportunity, especially with China on the prowl in the Pacific Islandshttps://t.co/tRse7G3dvi

— Keith Jackson AM FRSA FAIM (@PNGAttitude) May 27, 2022

China’s interests
Much of China’s diplomacy has been opportunistic and not dissimilar to what Australia and other partners are doing.

Although the region is strategically important to Australia, the southern Pacific islands are marginal to China. And apart from Kiribati and Nauru, the northern Pacific islands are closely linked to the US.

China’s interest may primarily be about demonstrating strategic reach, rather than for specific military purposes.

So, amplifying narratives about China’s threatening presence may unintentionally help China achieve its broader aim of influencing Australia.

And framing China’s presence almost exclusively as threatening may limit Australia’s manoeuvrability.

Given the accelerating frequency of natural disasters in the region due to climate change, it is only a matter of time before the Australian and Chinese militaries find themselves delivering humanitarian relief side-by-side. Being on sufficiently cordial terms to engage in even minimal coordination will be important.

Indeed, Australia should try to draw China into cooperative arrangements in the Pacific.

Reviving, updating, and seeking China’s signature of, the Pacific Islands Forum’s Cairns Compact on Development Coordination, would be a good start.

If China really has benign intentions, it should welcome this opportunity. The compact, a mechanism created by Pacific states, could help ensure China’s activities are well-coordinated and targeted alongside those of other partners.

Amplifying threat narratives also feeds into Australia’s perceived need to “compete” by playing whack-a-mole with China, rather than by formulating a coherent, overarching regional policy that responds to the priorities of Pacific states.

For example, Australia has funded Telstra’s purchase of Digicel, following interest from Chinese telco Huawei, despite questions over the benefits.

What will Australia offer next?
There is a risk some Pacific states may overestimate their ability to manage China. But for the time being it is understandable why at least some would entertain Chinese overtures.

New Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has rushed to Fiji days into the job with sought-after offers of action on climate change and expanded migration opportunities. Pacific leaders might be wondering what Australia will offer next.

Dr Joanne Wallis is professor of international security, University of Adelaide and Dr Maima Koro is a Pacific research fellow, University of Adelaide. This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons licence. Read the original article.

This content originally appeared on Asia Pacific Report and was authored by APR editor.

U.S. President Joe Biden has been hosting a special two-day summit with leaders from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) that ends Friday. At the summit, it’s expected that the U.S. will share more details of the framework, which is likely to get its official launch later this month when Biden visits South Korea and Japan.

It’s not a free trade pact in the mold of the Trans-Pacific Partnership that the Obama administration championed and negotiated for years as part of its foreign policy ‘pivot’ to Asia, only to see the Trump administration ditch it. An iteration of the same deal was later adopted by other Pacific Rim nations.

But the IPEF does seeks to foster ties with economic partners in the Indo-Pacific by setting trade rules and building a supply chain, without China.

In the words of President Biden at the East Asia Summit last year, the IPEF involves “trade facilitation, standards for the digital economy and technology, supply chain resiliency, decarbonization and clean energy, infrastructure, worker standards, and other areas of shared interest.”

On Thursday, Beijing warned Washington that the Asia-Pacific is “not a chessboard for geopolitical contest” and any regional cooperation framework should “follow the principle of respecting others’ sovereignty and non-interference in others’ internal affairs.”

The Chinese Foreign Ministry’s spokesperson Zhao Lijian said China rejects “Cold War mentality” when it comes to regional groupings.

The People’s Daily, the mouthpiece of China’s Communist Party, said in an editorial that the IPEF is designed to “make up for the shortcomings of Washington's previous engagement with Southeast Asia, which focused only on security and ignored the economy.”

“The U.S. holds profound political and strategic objectives aimed at forcing countries to decouple from China,” the paper quoted some analysts as saying.

The gathering in Washington is the second U.S.-ASEAN special summit since 2016, when then-President Barack Obama hosted leaders of the bloc in Sunnylands, California.

ASEAN leaders, minus Myanmar and the Philippines, attended a White House dinner with Biden on Thursday and met with a host of U.S. political and business leaders, but had no bilateral meetings with the U.S. president. Leaders were meeting with Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris on Friday at the State Department.

There are 10 ASEAN member states but Myanmar’s junta was not invited to the summit and the Philippines, which held a presidential election last weekend, only sent its foreign minister.

ASEAN’s cautiousness

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was the first ASEAN leader to welcome the IPEF.

Speaking at an engagement with the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce on Thursday, Lee said that the IPEF “needs to be inclusive and provide tangible benefits to encourage wider participation.”

“We encourage greater ASEAN participation in the IPEF and we hope the U.S. will directly invite and engage ASEAN member states in this endeavor," he said.

At present, it’s understood that only two of the 10 ASEAN countries - Singapore and the Philippines - are expected to be among the initial group of counties to sign up for the negotiations under IPEF.

“Most ASEAN members have remained hesitant to voice support for Biden's IPEF, which is, to their perceptions, a counterweight against China's Belt and Road Initiative in specific and Beijing's economic coercion in general,” said Huynh Tam Sang, a lecturer at Ho Chi Minh City University of Social Sciences and Humanities (USSH) in Vietnam.

“Given the economic proximity to China, ASEAN member states have sought to avoid provoking Beijing, let alone getting embedded in the Sino-U.S. competition,” Sang said.

Yet judging from prepared statements and initial feedback from ASEAN leaders on the prospects of ASEAN-U.S. economic cooperation and the IPEF, “they do not only value the substance of the relationship but are eager to see it grow,” according to Thomas Daniel, a senior fellow at Malaysia's Institute of Strategic and International Studies.

“Unfortunately, Washington is still unable to fully grasp or address the desire in Southeast Asia for practical dimensions that will bring an immediate and tangible benefit to local economies and communities,” he said.

On Thursday, Malaysian Prime Minister Ismail Sabri Yaakob urged the U.S. to adopt a more active trade and investment agenda with ASEAN countries. He pointed to the Chinese-backed Regional Economic Comprehensive Partnership, which took effect this year, as an important tool to invigorate regional business and economic activity through reduced trade barriers.

Seeking to offer concrete benefits at the summit, Biden offered US$150 million for ASEAN infrastructure, security, pandemic preparedness and other efforts.

More division in the bloc?

Details of the IPEF remain vague but policymakers in Washington have said that they’re designing a framework to prioritize flexibility and inclusion, with a pick-and-choose arrangement for participating countries, allowing them to select the individual areas where they want to make more specific commitments.

The IPEF looks to foster economic cooperation by establishing trade rules across “four pillars” - trade resiliency, infrastructure, decarbonization and anti-corruption.

An analysis by the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) said while the IPEF holds promise, “it will need to be well engineered and managed.”

“Wherever possible, the framework should seek to advance binding rules and hard commitments that go beyond broad principles and goals,” the CSIS said.

At the same time, “the Biden administration will need to offer tangible benefits to regional partners, especially less-developed ones,” according to the analysis.

There are warnings that the proposed framework, if not carefully considered, may even create a bigger gap between countries in the Southeast Asian region.

“Middle and small powers in Southeast Asia are likely to embrace a prudent approach when coming to great powers' proposed initiatives, especially when these multilateral frameworks could undermine ASEAN centrality,” said Sang from Vietnam’s USSH.

Countries like Singapore, the Philippines and Malaysia may seek to join some “pillars” that could serve their pragmatic interests but “China may seek to discourage regional small states about forging ties with Washington through partaking in the IPEF.”

Sang said that could in particular pose a dilemma for Laos and Cambodia, which may not want to left out, but have deep and growing economic ties with China.

This content originally appeared on Radio Free Asia and was authored by By RFA Staff.

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This content originally appeared on Project Censored and was authored by Project Censored.